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By all accounts, any serious attempt to combat climate change1 in the 
 *  Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director for the Energy Management & 
Innovation Center, University of Texas School of Law. 
 1. I will proceed on the following premises: (i) that the Earth’s climate is 
warming; (ii) that that warming is driven largely by human activity, primarily emissions 
of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) and deforestation; and (iii) it is desirable from both the 
technical and economic point of view to reduce the growth of carbon emissions, and 
stabilize concentrations of GHG emissions in the atmosphere.  While there is no 
consensus in support of these views among the American public, an overwhelming 
majority of the world’s climatologists and geoscientists support the first two premises 
above.  In the words of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), it is 
“very likely” that human activity is driving climate change.  See Summary for Policymakers, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms2.html.  For an accessible discussion of the impact 
of GHG emissions on climate, see The Causes of Global Climate Change, CTR. FOR 
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Aug. 2008), available at http://www. pewclimate.org/ 
docUploads/global-warming-science-brief-august08.pdf.  In May of 2011, the National 
Academy Of Sciences and the National Research Council issued a report once again 
endorsing the notion that global warming is a pressing national problem requiring policy 
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United States must address the ways in which Americans produce and 
consume electricity.  Coal-fired power remains the largest fuel source in 
the American electric system, representing about half of the U.S. 
generation.2  Coal and natural gas-fired generation, which emits about 
half as much carbon dioxide equivalent (“CO2e”),3 comprise a strong 
majority of the total, dwarfing the contribution of carbon-free sources of 
electricity, like nuclear, hydroelectric power, wind, and solar energy.  
Furthermore, America’s nuclear power plants are old and aging fast.  
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering applications 
for about 20 new nuclear power plants,4 but the Fukushima disaster in 
2011 has cast doubt on the wisdom of nuclear power, and even if 
licensed, it would take a decade or more for nuclear plants to be built.  
attention.  See America’s Climate Choices, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. (2011), available at 
http://nas-sites.org/americasclimatechoices/files/2011/05/ACC _Final_Report_Brief04.pdf.   
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere have increased from their pre-industrial level 
of 280 parts per million (“ppm”) to their current level of about 390 ppm.  See CO2 NOW, 
http://co2now.org/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (tracking atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2).  Because GHGs dissipate slowly in the atmosphere, today’s emissions will have 
warming effects for many years to come.  Among economists and policy analysts, a 
majority support the view that the net effects of climate change will be negative.  See, 
e.g., Frank Ackerman et al., The Economics of 350: The Benefits and Costs of Climate 
Change Stabilization, ECON. FOR EQUITY & THE ENV’T NETWORK 9 (Oct. 2009), available 
at http://www.e3network.org/papers/Economics_of_350.pdf; NICHOLAS STERN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: STERN REVIEW vi-vii (2006).  “Over the last decade, 
climatologists and some political leaders have concluded that growth in [GHG] 
emissions ought to be managed so as to stabilize concentrations at a level of 450 ppm or 
lower, in order to minimize the probability of catastrophic effects.  The 450 ppm number 
represents an estimate of the maximum atmospheric concentration that is necessary to 
keep global mean temperature increases at 2° C or lower.  However, there is considerable 
disagreement among climatologists and others over the desirable maximum concentration of 
[GHGs] in the atmosphere.  Some analysts argue that the 450 ppm figure is too high, 
because climate change is taking place considerably faster than scientists were predicting 
only a short time ago.”  There is also considerable disagreement about the geographic 
distribution of those effects, and about whether the costs of combating climate change 
exceed the benefits for the United States.  For an analysis of these policy debates and 
brief description of the climatological literature, see David B. Spence, Regulation, 
‘Republican Moments,’ and Energy Policy Reform, at 7 (2011) (on file with author). 
 2. Electric Power Annual 2009, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 2 (Apr. 2009), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482009.pdf. 
 3. Carbon dioxide is the most plentiful GHG, by volume in the atmosphere.  
Other GHGs, such as nitrous oxide and methane, have even greater heat-trapping qualities, 
but are much less plentiful.  Hence, most discussions of GHG emissions calculate emissions 
and emissions reductions using carbon dioxide as an index gas, and speak of “carbon 
dioxide equivalent” (“CO2e”). 
 4. “By issuing a combined license (COL), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) authorizes the licensee to construct and . . . operate a nuclear power plant at a 
specific site” for 40 years.  The NRC also issues separate early site permits and operating 
licenses for applicants not wishing to pursue a COL.  Combined License Applications for 
New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-
reactors/col.html (last updated March 10, 2011) (providing a table with information to 
the public on the COL applications the NRC has received as of March 10, 2011). 
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Similarly, most of the profitable locations for hydroelectric projects were 
taken up long ago, and few analysts anticipate large-scale growth in 
hydroelectric development in the United States.5  For that reason, some 
argue that the United States must rely more heavily on renewable energy 
sources like wind and solar power, as well as conservation, if it is to 
achieve the goal of stabilizing carbon emissions.6 
More specifically, Robert Socolow and Stephen Pacala suggest an 
approach for stabilizing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) concentrations that 
focuses on so-called “stabilization wedges.”7  These wedges represent sets 
of measures (of roughly equal effect8) that society can take to reduce 
growth in the rate of GHG emissions sufficiently to stabilize GHG 
concentrations at roughly 500 parts per million.9  Several of these sets of 
 5. While it is possible that rising electricity prices could make some undeveloped 
sites economical, or cause owners of existing dams to expand, environmental groups are 
exerting downward pressure on hydroelectric generating capacity, seeking the 
decommissioning of existing hydroelectric facilities on environmental grounds when 
they come up for relicensing.  This effort has been led by environmental groups like 
American Rivers.  See, e.g., Edwards Mfg. Co., 84 F.E.R.C.  ¶ 61,227, 62,091 (1998) 
(authorizing a negotiated removal of the Edwards dam on the Kennebec River in order to 
restore historic salmon migration routes); FPL Energy Maine Hydro, LLC, 107 F.E.R.C. 
¶ 61,120, 61,403 (2004) (authorizing dam removal in connection with surrender of a 
license); Dams and Dam Removal, AM. RIVERS, http://www.americanrivers.org/our-
work/restoring-rivers/dams/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
 6. See Martin L. Hoffert, Farewell to Fossil Fuels?, 329 SCI. 1292, 1293 (2010), 
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/329/5997/1292.full.pdf (“Maintaining 
world economic growth and keeping atmospheric CO2 concentrations below 450 ppm, 
even with continuing improvements in energy intensity (the amount of CO2 emitted per 
unit of energy, and a proxy for increasing energy efficiency and less consumptive 
lifestyles), will require ~30 terawatts (TW) of power from carbon-neutral sources at mid-
century.”). 
 7. “We idealize the 50-year emissions reductions as a perfect triangle in Fig. 1B.  
Stabilization is represented by a ‘flat’ trajectory of fossil fuel emissions at 7 GtC/year, 
and BAU is represented by a straight-line ‘ramp’ trajectory rising to 14 GtC/year in 
2054.  The ‘stabilization triangle,’ located between the flat trajectory and BAU, removes 
exactly one third of BAU emissions.  To keep the focus on technologies that have the 
potential to produce a material difference by 2054, we divide the stabilization triangle 
into seven equal ‘wedges.’  A wedge represents an activity that reduces emissions to the 
atmosphere that starts at zero today and increases linearly until it accounts for 1 GtC/year 
of reduced carbon emissions in 50 years.  It thus represents a cumulative total of 25 GtC 
of reduced emissions over 50 years.”  Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization 
Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 
305 SCI. 968, 968 (2004), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/305/5686/ 968.full. 
 8. Each wedge would produce a decrease in projected carbon emissions out of 
roughly 25 Gt by 2050.  Id. at 968. 
 9. The authors call them “wedges” because adoption of each measure would 
reduce the slope of the curve that depicts growth in GHG concentrations over time.  
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measures would prescribe fairly drastic increases in our reliance on 
renewable electricity, as well as the adoption of energy efficiency 
investments.  For example, Socolow and Pacala call for raising average 
fuel economy standards for vehicles to 60 miles per gallon, doubling our 
reliance on nuclear energy, and increasing our wind and solar electric 
generating capacity by factors of 50 and 700, respectively.10  Whether or 
not these specific prescriptions are followed, any serious attempt to stem 
the growth of carbon emissions must include significant increases in 
renewable electricity, as well as energy efficiency investments. 
These changes, in turn, will have implications for the shape and operation 
of the American electric grid.  It is logical to infer that if we increase the 
percentage of electricity that comes from clean sources like wind and 
solar power, we will realize a corresponding decrease in the GHG 
emissions associated with electricity generation.  However, even if wind 
and solar power can overcome the problem of cost competitiveness to 
assume a growing proportion of our electric generation mix, that increase 
will not necessarily produce corresponding decreases in GHG emissions 
because wind and solar power is intermittent.  Because it is intermittent, it 
must be backed up by a more reliable source of power, such as coal or 
natural gas-fired generation.  When fossil fuel generation is used to back 
up intermittent sources, however, it operates much less efficiently, emitting 
more GHGs per unit of energy produced than when it is used to serve 
base load.  This means that while the increased reliance upon renewable 
electricity may represent an environmental improvement (in terms of 
GHG emissions), it may be a much smaller improvement than most 
expect. 
Similarly, it is equally logical to infer that rationally self-interested 
consumers will take advantage of potential money-saving opportunities 
represented by electricity conservation and the opportunity to manage 
demand.  However, there exists a variety of behavioral and other 
impediments to the realization of these cost-saving (or money-making) 
opportunities. 
In Part I of this essay, I outline some of the background characteristics 
of the electric grid, the way it is operated, and the way regulators and 
grid operators manage the sale and transmission of electricity across it.  
In Part II, I explore the opportunities and potential problems associated 
with integrating intermittent, renewable sources of electric generation 
into the grid.  This discussion includes a review of a number of recent 
studies examining the GHG emissions effects of using fossil fueled 
Thus, each section of the area under the GHG concentration growth curve looks like a 
wedge.  Id. at 969 fig.1(B). 
 10. Id. at 969–71. 
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generation to back up wind power, as well as the U.S. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) recent rulemakings addressing this 
issue.  Part III explores the potential cost and pollution reduction savings 
associated with better management of our electricity demand, and why 
many of those opportunities remain unrealized.  This discussion includes 
a review of the behavioral economics literature addressing this phenomenon, 
as well as FERC’s recent rulemakings aimed at reducing the growth in 
peak demand by encouraging demand response.  Part IV offers some 
concluding thoughts. 
I.  THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC GRID 
The American electric grid is an enormous network of transmission 
and distribution lines designed to transmit electric current from large 
central generating stations to “load”—that is, consumers of electricity.  
We make a distinction between transmission, the movement of electricity 
over longer distances at higher voltages,11 and distribution, the delivery 
of electricity at lower voltages12 from high-voltage transmission lines to 
end-users.  Modern electric transmission systems became possible only 
after George Westinghouse’s promotion of an alternating current 
transmission system in the late 1800s.13  Westinghouse’s system built upon 
Nikola Tesla’s work with transformers (which enabled companies to 
increase and decrease voltage at key points in the system).14  Most of the 
 11. “Voltage” is the force by which electric current moves along transmission or 
distribution lines.  Generally, transmission lines move power at voltages exceeding 110 
kilovolts (“kV”); some transmission lines, however, move power at voltages in excess of 
1,000 kV. 
 12. Distribution lines move power at less than 110 kV, typically between 4 and 
34.5 kV. 
 13. Prior to this innovation, electric power could move in only one direction along 
transmission lines.  Alternating current allowed for bidirectional movement.  In the early 
years of the electric industry, Thomas Edison championed direct current transmissions.  
Westinghouse’s view, however, ultimately prevailed, leading to the alternating current 
system we use today.  For a comprehensive description of these early days of electric 
power, see MAURY KLEIN, THE POWER MAKERS: STEAM, ELECTRICITY, AND THE MEN 
WHO INVENTED MODERN AMERICA (2008). 
 14. Transformers are used to increase or decrease voltage at junctions in the grid.  
For example, a transformer at the junction of a high-voltage transmission line in a 
distribution line may step power down to the appropriate distribution voltage.  A 
transformer at the junction of a power plant connector and a high-voltage transmission 
line may step power up to the appropriate transmission voltage.  Power must be stepped 
down to reach voltages used in homes and businesses, typically between 120 and 240 
Volts.  Id. at 329–30. 
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modern American electric grid consists of alternating current lines organized 
into three large systems, as shown in Figure 1: the Eastern Interconnection, 
the Western Interconnection and the Texas Interconnection.15 


















*Figure source: U.S. Dept. of Energy16 
 
Within each of these three systems, virtually every generator of electricity 
is connected (however indirectly) with virtually every consumer by 
electricity.  In an alternating current system, the seller of electricity cannot 
steer her particular electrons or particular bits of electric current to its 
customer.  Rather, electric current follows the path of least resistance, 
irrespective of the intentions of individual buyers and sellers of electricity.  
That is, in Figure 2, if Generator B wishes to sell 100 kilowatt-hours 
(“kWh”) of electricity to Consumer 4, Generator B cannot direct that 
 15. The Texas interconnection is separated from the remainder of the American 
grid primarily to avoid federal jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act, though Texas 
avoids some federal regulation only because of cooperation of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and Congress.  For a description of this separate 
Texas system, see DAVID SPENCE & DARREN BUSH, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING THE 
TEXAS STORY 9–21 (L. Lynne Kiesling & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 2009). 
 16. Frequently-Asked Questions (FAQS) About Transmission Planning in the 
Western Interconnection, WESTERN ELEC. COORDINATING COUNCIL 5, available at http:// 
www.wecc.biz/Planning/TransmissionExpansion/RTEP/Transmission%20Planning/RTE
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power to Consumer 4 over particular transmission and distribution lines, 
nor will all of the power travel across the most direct route to get to 
Consumer 4.  Rather, as the dotted lines in Figure 2 indicate, once 
Generator B produces that electricity and dispatches it to the grid, some 
of the power will take a rather indirect or “circuitous” route.  How much 
current moves along each of these two routes depends upon a number of 
factors, including differential levels of resistance in lines along these 
routes.  This tendency for electric current to take multiple paths to its 
destination is known as “loop flow.” 





















Because of loop flows, the grid’s generation and consumption loads 
must be kept in balance.  That is, at any given point in time, the amount 
of electricity being dispatched to the grid by generators must equal the 
amount been taken off the grid by consumers.  If loads are not balanced, 
the system will fail, causing blackouts, for example.  The grid’s day-to-
day managers, the “control area operators,” perform this balancing 
function.  Typically, there is quite a bit of variation in load, both over the 
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course of a day, and seasonally.17  Residential electric loads, for example, 
tend to be highest in the late afternoon and early evenings, when people 
get home from work, but before they go to bed.  Seasonal loads are highest 
in the summer and hot weather climates, and in the winter in cold weather 
climates.  To keep loads in balance, control area operators must marshal 
a great deal of information about historic usage patterns, weather 
forecasts, generators’ operational plans, and more to estimate levels of 
supply and demand in the near term and longer-term future.  With that 
information, control area operators can have supply resources ready and 
available18 to dispatch power when demand increases; or, they can have 
demand-side resources ready to curtail their usage19 should that become 
necessary to balance the load. 
For most of the history of the American electric system, these 
balancing services were performed by vertically-integrated, investor-
owned electric utilities, companies that owned generating facilities and 
the transmission and distribution lines necessary to get electric power 
from plants to customer.  Under the traditional system of public utility rate 
regulation, these investor-owned utilities were granted monopoly status, 
chartered by the state public utilities commissions to be the sole provider 
of electric service within their specified geographic areas.20  In return, 
they were obligated to provide reliable service on a nondiscriminatory 
basis.  Rate regulation allowed (and still allows, where it remains in 
place) investor-owned utilities to recover through rates all of their reasonably 
incurred costs, and to earn a fair return on their prudently made 
 17. See Matt Davison et al., Development of a Hybrid Model for Electrical Power 
Spot Prices, 17 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 257, 260 (2002), available at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1007890 (“It is known that 
power demand is tightly linked to weather and follows predictable seasonal and diurnal 
patterns.”). 
 18. We refer to these excess supply resources as “reserves.”  “Spinning reserves” 
are generating facilities that are ramped up and ready to dispatch power to the grid at a 
moment’s notice. 
 19. “Load control and demand side load management programs have been 
implemented in many competitive power markets.  These programs can be classified as a 
set of system operator (usually ISO)-based programs that allow end users to provide 
interruptible load as a commodity in the electricity market . . . .  These programs provide 
various incentives for end users to reduce load or use on-site generation during high 
price periods.”  See P. Jazayri et. al., A Survey of Load Control Programs for Price and 
System Stability, 20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 1504, 1504 (2005), available 
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/search/freesrchabstract.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1490604. 
 20. By the early 1900s, most states had established utilities commissions charged 
with the task of regulating electric and gas companies, and setting their retail rates.  The 
first state public utility commission was created in the late 19th century.  This was the 
Massachusetts Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners.  Alfred E. Forstall, 
Government Control of the Price of Gas, in PUBLIC POLICY 329, 332 (1900) (describing 
the Massachusetts commission as the “only organized attempt at government control of 
the gas business in the United States”). 
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investments—that is, investments in capital necessary to provide these 
generation, transmission and distribution services.21 
In this system, investor-owned utilities traditionally generated most of 
the power they sold to their customers, and supplied it over lines they 
owned.  Therefore, balancing loads was primarily an intra-company 
activity.  On those rare occasions when it was necessary to coordinate 
transmission or distribution activities with the neighboring utility (for 
example, because one utility wishes to buy wholesale power from its 
neighbor during times of shortage, or to move power across service area 
lines in order to relieve congestion or ensure system reliability), 
neighboring utilities coordinated these transactions informally, knowing 
that the cost of the transaction would be recovered through rates.  Wholesale 
rates were regulated by FERC,22 but state utilities commissions typically 
allowed wholesale power purchase costs to be passed through to customers 
in retail rates.  This informal coordination process took on greater 
importance after the 1965 blackout on the Eastern Seaboard.  That accident 
prompted the formation of the North American Electric Reliability 
Council (“NERC”).  NERC organized the creation of informal “power 
pools,” regional associations of electric utilities charged with ensuring 
system reliability and facilitating reliability-based coordination of grid 
management activities between utilities. 
In the 1980s, the electricity industry began to change in ways that 
complicated the task of grid management.  The seeds of change were 
sown in the 1970s.  First, in 1973, the Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,23 upholding charges of antitrust 
violations against an electric utility that refused to “wheel” power (that 
is, to transmit power for third parties over its own transmission lines) 
from a third-party supplier to a municipal utility.  Prior to the Otter Tail 
decision, municipal utilities lying entirely within the service area of 
investor-owned electric utility were captive wholesale customers.  The 
 21. The standard way of describing the ratemaking process is to say that in rate 
cases, utility commissions typically make rate decisions using the following equation:  R 
= Br + O, where R represents the company’s total revenue requirements, B represents 
the rate base, r represents the permissible rate of return on investment, and O represents 
permissible operating expenses.  Assets that are used and useful to the company’s task of 
supplying electric service are includable within rate base, and are those on which the 
company is guaranteed a fair return. 
 22. Under the Federal Power Act, FERC is charged with ensuring that wholesale 
rates are “just and reasonable.”  Federal Power Act § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006). 
 23. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973). 
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Otter Tail decision raised the prospect that these municipal utilities and 
others might one day be able to buy power from someone other than the 
local investor-owned utility, and to have that power delivered over the 
utility’s transmission and distribution lines.  Five years later, the passage 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 197824 (“PURPA”) 
promoted both electricity conservation programs and the construction of 
“alternative” forms of electricity production by providing financial 
incentives to new, nonutility producers25 of renewable electricity and 
cogeneration.26  The presence of nonutility generators in the market created 
additional pressure for nondiscriminatory access to the electric grid as a 
transmission service; these nonutility generators wanted to sell their 
electricity directly to retailers or industrial customers.  Congress responded 
to that pressure in the Energy Policy Act of 199227 by authorizing 
FERC to order electric utilities to wheel power over their transmission 
lines.28  FERC exercised that power in 1996 when it promulgated Orders 
888 and 889, mandating (i) the unbundling of electricity transmission 
from electricity sales in wholesale markets, and (ii) that owners of 
transmission lines act as common carriers providing transmission service 
on a nondiscriminatory basis to affiliated and non-affiliated companies 
alike.29  As a consequence of this unbundling, FERC began to authorize 
wholesale sellers to charge market-based rates.30 
 24. Policy Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2602–3211 (2005). 
 25. In PURPA parlance, these nonutility generators were called “qualifying facilities” 
(“QFs”) because they qualified for the financial benefits offered under the statute. 
 26. PURPA defined “alternative” energy facilities to include various forms 
of renewable energy like solar, wind, and geothermal, as well as small hydroelectric facilities 
and cogeneration plants.  Cogeneration facilities produce electricity as well as usable 
heat energy, and most of the many hundreds of cogeneration facilities built after the passage 
of PURPA in the 1980s were gas-fired. 
 27. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486 § 721, 106 Stat. 2915 
(1992) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2005)) (provision for open access to 
transmission lines). 
 28. Id. §§ 711–12. 
 29. Order 888 required transmission line owners to file so-called “open-access 
tariffs” offering nondiscriminatory transmission services, and to “functionally unbundle” 
transmission from electricity sales.  Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open-Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 
Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37).  Order 889 
mandated transparency in transmission services by requiring all takers of transmission 
services (including affiliates of the transmission owner) to take such services using an 
open-access posting system.  Order No. 889, Open-Access Same-Time Information 
System  (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). 
 30. See, e.g., Entergy Services, Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,234, 61,753 (1992) (authorizing 
electricity sales at market-based rates). 
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At around the same time, a sizeable minority of American states began 
to introduce competition and market-based rates into their retail markets,31 
with California,32 Texas,33 and New York34 leading the way.  Because of 
all of these developments, many incumbent utilities in these states sold 
most of their generation assets or spun them off into subsidiaries, increasing 
the profile of independent merchant generators, marketers, and brokers 
within the industry.  Consequently, the number and volume of arms-
length transactions on wholesale electricity markets grew by leaps and 
bounds, straining the capacity of both the transmission grid and regulators.  
In response, FERC pushed owners of transmission lines to form 
“independent system operators” (“ISOs”) and “regional transmission 
organizations” (“RTOs”) to help manage the grid, ensure system reliability, 
and guard against discrimination and the exercise of market power in the 
provision of transmission services.35  By the turn of the century, active 
electricity trading hubs had arisen around several of these ISOs and 
RTOs, including the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (“PJM”) RTO, 
the New York ISO, the California ISO, and the New England RTO.36  In 
states that opted out of retail restructuring, some public utilities continued to 
generate most of the electricity they sold to customers, while others satisfied 
most of their electricity needs from wholesale markets.  In any case, because 
electricity demand is highly variable (both daily and seasonally), most 
electricity retailers must participate in spot markets in order to balance 
supply with demand. 
 
 
 31. See The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: An Update, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 70–77 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
chg_stru_update/update2000.pdf. 
 32. See Assem. B. 1890, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). 
 33. See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 39.001–.910 (Vernon 2002). 
 34. See In re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Elec. Serv., 1999 WL 1442552 
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 6, 1999) (No. 94-E-0952); In re Competitive Opportunities 
Regarding Elec. Serv., 1996 WL 293495 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n May 20, 1996) (No. 
94-E-0952). 
 35. Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285 
(1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 53). 
 36. For a description of the status of electricity trading hubs at the turn of the 
century, see The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: An Update, supra 
note 31, at 9, 78. 
 277 
 
SPENCE - FINAL NO AUTHOR EDITS TO ACCEPT (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2016  11:29 AM 
 


















     Figure source: U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission37 
 
In this new regime, more electricity travels farther than ever before.  
Individual ISOs and RTOs manage grid operations and electricity spot 
markets over geographic areas that are many times larger than even the 
largest investor-owned utility service area that existed under the traditional 
regime.  Figure 3, a map of North American ISOs and RTOs, illustrates 
this point.  Thus, one of the tasks of today’s regulators and regulated 
companies alike is to adapt 20th-century grid to 21st-century electricity 
markets.  These ISOs and RTOs oversee organized wholesale electric 
markets in at least three important ways.  First, they oversee the operation of 
the electricity spot market, which typically involves matching day-ahead 
bids from buyers and sellers to produce a market-clearing price, typically 
one that will be paid by all buyers and sellers of spot electricity.  Second, 
they schedule so-called ancillary services: reserves, spinning reserves, 
and regulation.  The term “reserves” refers to the generating capacity 
that is currently unused but which is available to serve load; if that 
capacity is already running, so that operator may dispatch its electricity 
to the grid on very short notice, it qualifies as “spinning reserves.”38  
 37. RTO/ISO Map, FERC, available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus- 
act/rto/rto-map.asp. 
 38. See Willett Klempton & Jasna Tomić, Vehicle-to-Grid Power Fundamentals: 
Calculating Capacity and Net Revenue, 144 J. OF POWER SOURCES 268, 271 (2005), available 
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“Regulation” services are the grid management activities that maintain 
voltages at their proper level, to ensure grid reliability.39  Third, operators 
ensure that there is sufficient generating capacity over the long term to 
meet projected demand.  They can ensure adequate reserves in either or 
both of two ways: one way is by including the value of capacity in energy 
prices, as is done in the ERCOT ISO system in Texas;40 another is to create 
and manage separate capacity markets in which owners of electricity 
generators are paid to have capacity available in the event that capacity 
is needed in the future.  In the PJM, New England, and New York systems, 
for example, capacity markets are run.41 
Thus, the maintenance of a reliable electric grid poses technical and 
economic challenges.  Each new source of electricity, including renewables, 
must be operated in such a way as to maintain grid reliability.  Furthermore, 
ISOs and RTOs must try to find a way to ensure that each new “source” 
of generation (demand-side or supply-side) is adequately compensated 
for the services it provides, and pays for the costs it imposes on the 
system as a whole.  These are not easy tasks. 
II.  RENEWABLE ENERGY 
One appeal of renewable sources of power such as solar, wind and tidal 
or wave energy, is its absence of GHG emissions.  Viewed on a lifecycle 
basis, these sources of power emit far fewer GHGs than their fossil 
fueled counterparts,42 and compare favorably on other environmental 
reserves refers to additional generating capacity that can provide power quickly, say 
within 10 minutes, upon request from the grid operator.”). 
 39. See id. 
 40. This system attempts to address the inadequate incentives to invest in 
infrastructure resources such as generation capacity by addressing the imperfections in 
the market’s design.  The resulting “energy only” market does not remove the need for 
regulatory interventions, but substantially changes the nature of those interventions.  See 
William W. Hogan, On an “Energy Only” Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy, 
HARV. JOHN F. KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV’T 34 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://www. 
hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_Energy_Only_092305.pdf. 
 41.  “Capacity markets provide economic incentives to attract investment in new 
and existing supply-side and demand-side capacity resources . . . . [T]he [Forward Capacity 
Market] contains an auction structure through which capacity resources compete to 
obtain a market-priced capacity payment, in exchange for a commitment to be available 
in the years ahead to meet the region’s electricity [demands].”  See Capacity Market, ISO 
NEW ENG., http://www.iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/cap_mkt/index.html 
(last visited Jun 16, 2011). 
 42. “Greenhouse gas emissions . . . were generally estimated according to the full 
operational life cycle of each renewable energy technology including CO2e emissions 
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criteria as well.  According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
total American electric generation from the electric power sector was a 
little over 2.4 million gigawatt-hours (“GWh”) in 2010.43  Of that total, 
coal-fired generation represented about 1.4 million GWh, natural gas-
fired generation nearly another 380,000 GWh, and nuclear power about 
424,000 GWh.44  Non-hydro renewables represented only 130,000 GWh.45  
Why then, haven’t renewables achieved greater penetration in American 
electricity markets? 
A.  The Rise of Renewables 
Technically speaking, a great deal of potential wind and solar energy 
remains untapped in the United States.46  Indeed, if cost (and opportunity 
cost) were no object, we could easily generate more power using the wind 
and the sun than we consume each year.  However, costs (and opportunity 
costs) do matter.  In most locations, the delivered cost of wind and solar 
power is higher than power from other sources.47  However, the cost of 
generating electricity from renewable sources has decreased over time,48 
from manufacturing of the plant to full operation of the technology . . . .  The emissions 
are found to vary widely within each technology . . . .  Overall, wind has the lowest 
CO2e emissions, with only around 25 g/kW h CO2e.  Hydro and photovoltaics also have 
low emissions, with average reported values at less than 100 g/kW h CO2e.  The average 
emissions from geothermal are fair at 170 g/kW h, however the range includes all 
possible values for gas emissions and may even be as high as a low-emitting coal fired 
power station.  For all technologies except hydro, CO2e emissions account for all significant 
carbon emissions.”  See Annette Evans et al., Assessment of Sustainability Indicators for 
Renewable Energy Technologies, 13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1082, 
1084 (2009), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S136403210 
8000555. 
 43. Total Electric Power Industry Summary Statistics, Year-to-Date 2011 and 2010, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/excel/ 
epmxlfilees1_b.xls. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Charmaine Watts, Going Completely Renewable: 
Is it Possible (Let Alone Desirable)?, 22 THE ELECTRICITY J. 95, 103 (2009) (“[T]he 
United States has an enormous cache of renewable energy resources that it has only 
begun to utilize.”). 
 47. The mean price of electricity for photovoltaic and wind power is $0.24 kW h 
and $0.07 kW h respectively.  This compares to $0.042 kW h for coal and $0.048 kW h 
for gas.  These numbers account for the cost of capital, but not the cost of transmission, 
which can add up to $0.015 kW h when long transmission lines are necessary.  Transmission 
over long distances is more common with renewables than non-renewables.  See Annette 
Evans et al., Assessment of Sustainability Indicators for Renewable Energy 
Technologies, 13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1082, 1083–84 (2009). 
 48. “[C]ontinued technological advances will likely make renewable power plants 
cheaper.  If current trends continue, the cost of solar electricity generation is expected to 
drop to 6 to 10¢/kWh by 2020 due to improvements in module production through 
thinner layers, the introduction of a broader range of materials (including crystalline 
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stimulated in part by government incentives and regulatory mandates.  
Specifically, we can point to three types of policies that have given a push to 
renewable electricity since the latter part of the 20th century: renewable 
portfolio standards, tax incentives, and carbon regulation. 
Renewable portfolio standards.  As noted above, PURPA had given a 
boost to renewable electricity in the 1980s, stimulating a great deal of 
small hydro development, as well as some wind and solar development.49  
At around the same time, states began establishing “renewable portfolio 
standards” (“RPSs”), requiring electric utilities to buy a specified 
percentage (or, in some cases, amount) of electricity from renewable 
sources.50  Since the 1980s, more than half of American states have 
adopted some form of a RPS.  State RPSs vary widely: each define 
“renewable energy” differently, and establishes different targets as well, 
from Minnesota’s requirement that 25 percent of all electricity come 
from renewables by the year 202551 and California’s requirement that 
utilities acquire one-third of their electricity from renewables by 2020,52 
to Texas’s rather modest goals, which are established not in percentages 
of power sold but rather in megawatts (“MW”) of capacity.53  In the 
silicon, gallium arsenide, cadmium telluride, copper indium selenide, and recycled silicon), 
the integration of glass and PV production facilities, the construction of adhesives on-
site, innovative designs, and better economies of scale.  The same ‘learning effect’ will 
likely reduce costs by 20 to 60 percent for other wind and bioelectric power stations.”  
See Sovacool & Watts, supra note 46, at 98–99. 
 49. See Sanya Carley, Historical Analysis of U.S. Electricity Markets: Reassessing 
Carbon Lock-in, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 720, 725 (2010), available at http://www.science 
direct.com/science/article/pii/S0301421510007962 (“PURPA additionally gave rise to 
wind and industrial steam technologies, promoted the re-entry of small hydro dams, and 
encouraged research and development efforts in other technologies, such as the fuel cell, 
solar troughs, and fluidized bed combustion boilers.”). 
 50. These targets, and definitions of qualified sources vary by state.  For up-to-date 
information about state RPSs, see DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & 
EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/. 
 51. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691 (2010). 
 52. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.30(c)(2) (West 2011) (“The quantities of eligible 
renewable energy resources to be procured for all other compliance periods reflect 
reasonable progress in each of the intervening years sufficient to ensure that the 
procurement of electricity products from eligible renewable energy resources achieves 
25 percent of retail sales by December 31, 2016, and 33 percent of retail sales by 
December 31, 2020.”). 
 53. Texas’s goals are modest for two reasons.  First, each time the legislature has 
raised the target, the market has already built nearly that much capacity.  Second, the 
goals are essentially voluntary, and there are no significant financial consequences for 
retail energy providers who fail to meet them.  See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.904 (West 
1999), amended by TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.904 (West 2005) (replacing the renewable 
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summer of 2009, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2454, the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also known as the 
“Waxman-Markey bill,”54 which would have established a national RPS 
effective in 2012 (with an ultimate goal of requiring utilities to secure 20 
percent of their electricity from renewable sources by the year 2020).55  
Its companion bill in the Senate was S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and 
American Power Act, also known as the “Kerry-Boxer bill.”56  The 
Kerry-Boxer bill did not include a national RPS, and it was never reported 
out of committee in the Senate; for its part, the Waxman-Markey bill was 
pronounced “dead on arrival” in the Senate by various commentators.57  
The prospects for a federal RPS in the 112th Congress are uncertain at 
best.  In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama proposed 
a “Clean Energy Standard” that would include some non-renewables 
under the definition of clean energy.58  Although there have been reports 
that legislation reflecting the president’s plan will be introduced in the 
Senate,59 the Republican-controlled House of Representatives may be 
less favorably disposed to any sort of federal clean energy legislation, 
including a federal RPS.  Nonetheless, despite the lack of a national RPS, 
some analysts credit state RPSs for increases in the development of 
renewable electricity.60 
capacity targets every two years from 2003–2009, with new targets every two years from 
2007–2015).  For an excellent comparison of state RPS programs, and assessment of 
their effectiveness, see Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National 
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010). 
 54. H.R. Res. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted) [hereinafter Waxman-Markey].  
The named sponsors are Congressman Henry Waxman of California and Congressman 
Ed Markey of Massachusetts. 
 55. Id. § 101. 
 56. S. Res. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Kerry-Boxer].  The named 
sponsors are Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts and Senator Barbara Boxer of California.  
Kerry-Boxer would impose many of the same new requirements as Waxman-Markey, 
with a few differences.  For example, it did not contain a national RPS. 
 57. Harry Fuller, Repubs Say Waxman-Markey Bill is DOA in Senate, ZDNET 
(June 28, 2009), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/green/repubs-say-the-waxman-markey-bill-
is-doa-in-senate/5667. 
 58. See President Barack Obama, 2011 State of the Union Speech (Jan. 25, 2011) 
(copy of transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/ 
remarks-president-state-union-address) (“Some folks want wind and solar.  Others want 
nuclear, clean coal and natural gas.  To meet this goal we will need them all . . . .”). 
 59. See Tom Udall, Mark Udall Introduce Renewable Standard Legislation, TOM 
UDALL SEN. FOR N.M., http://tomudall.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=815 (last visited 
Jun. 2, 2011) (“U.S. Senators Tom Udall (D-NM) and Mark Udall (D-CO) today 
continued their fight to enact a federal Renewable Energy Standard (RES) by introducing 
legislation that would require utilities to generate 25 percent of their electricity from 
wind, solar and other renewable energy sources by 2025.”). 
 60. See Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
& ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/ 
rps.cfm (last updated Jan. 20, 2012) (“While the success of state efforts to increase 
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Tax credits.  Many analysts ascribe even more of the credit for the 
growth in renewables to federal tax incentives.  Ever since the 1970s, the 
federal government has periodically offered production tax credits and/or 
investment tax credits to wind, solar and other sources of renewable 
electricity.  These programs have typically of a very short duration, but 
have been renewed regularly.61  Production tax credits compensate 
producers (in the form of reductions of their tax liability) on a per kWh 
of renewable electricity produced basis. Investment tax credits offer 
similar tax liability reductions for investments in renewable electricity.  
The current federal production tax credit for wind power, for example, is 
2.2 cents per kWh.62 
Some contend that investment in wind and solar power has been 
disadvantaged over the years by the unpredictability of these tax credits.  
In the early 2000s, for example, a backlog on wind turbine orders slowed 
many wind projects, partly because wind turbine producers were dissuaded 
from investing in additional plant capacity by the unpredictability of 
federal renewable tax credits.63  Nevertheless, production tax credits seem 
to be a fairly powerful incentive.  For instance, the production tax credit 
for wind power has, on occasion, been credited with producing negative 
prices for electricity at night in West Texas, where wind power 
producers paid (something less than 2 cents per kWh) to dispatch their 
power to the grid in order to receive the production tax credit (of about 2 
cents per kWh).64  
renewable or alternative energy production will depend in part on federal policies such as 
production tax credits, states have been effective in encouraging clean energy generation.”). 
 61. The energy package signed by President Carter in 1978 included investment 
tax credits and accelerated depreciation for alternative energy projects.  These tax credits 
expired during the Reagan administration.  In 1992, Congress established a production 
tax credit for renewable energy projects in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.  Congress has 
intermittently renewed short-term investment and/or production tax credits for renewable 
energy ever since, and production credits still remain in effect. 
 62. See Form 8835, IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8835.pdf. 
 63. “While the industry was fortunate to gain short-term extensions in the past, 
these shorter time periods create uncertainty and a ‘boom-and-bust’ cycle of short-term 
planning, near annual job layoffs and higher cost projects.  Without a long-term policy, 
manufacturers are discouraged from investing in, and expanding, manufacturing 
facilities in the U.S.”  See Production Tax Credit (PTC), AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, 
available at http://www.awea.org/issues/federal_policy/upload/PTC_April-2011.pdf (last 
visited Jun. 9, 2011). 
 64. See Lessons Learned from Renewable Energy Credit (REC) Trading in Texas, 
BUREAU OF ECON. GEOLOGY 20 (2009), available at http://www.beg.utexas.edu/ 
energyecon/transmission_forum/CEE_Texas_RPS_Study.pdf (wind generators, which 
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Carbon regulation.  At first blush, it may seem unlikely that carbon 
regulation has stimulated development of renewable electricity.  While 
the United States signed the Kyoto Accord in the 1990s (pledging 
reductions in GHG emissions65), the United States never ratified the 
agreement, and Congress has since declined to enact legislation regulating 
GHG emissions.66  However, where Congress has been quiet, voluntary 
markets, the states, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
have been active.  For example, the Chicago Climate Exchange operates a 
voluntary market in “carbon offsets,” through which purchasers seeking to 
reduce their carbon footprint pay others to reduce CO2e emissions.67  Much 
of the demand for these offsets comes from outside the United States, 
though some companies and individuals within the country choose to 
purchase offsets voluntarily.  According to a 2008 government accountability 
office study: 
A wide variety of consumers buy offsets, including individuals, businesses, 
nonprofits, governments, research institutions, universities, religious congregations, 
utilities, and other organizations.  Consumers’ motivations for purchasing offsets 
may include corporate responsibility and public relations, among others.68 
At the state level, in 2006 the State of California enacted AB 32, a law 
establishing a statewide program of GHG emission regulation that aims 
to reduce emissions in California to 1990 levels by the year 2020.69  AB 
32 recently survived a judicial challenge70 and the state governor has 
needed wind power to be dispatched to collect production tax credits, submitted negative 
bids in certain hours). 
 65. See What Does the Kyoto Protocol Mean to U.S. Energy Markets and the U.S. 
Economy?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 2 (Oct. 1998), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
oiaf/kyoto/pdf/kyotobrf.pdf (“The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated by more than 160 nations 
in December 1997, aims to reduce net emissions of certain greenhouse gases.”). 
 66. “[U]ntil recently, the federal government’s attitude toward climate change 
ranged from ‘simple inaction to outright obstructionism,’ with little meaningful federal 
regulation and documented efforts to play down the extent and serious effects of climate 
change.”  Margaret Rosso Grossman, Climate Change and the Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
223, 231 (2010). 
 67. “Chicago Climate Exchange is North America’s largest and longest running 
greenhouse gas emission [offsets] program.  From 2003 through 2010 CCX operated as a 
comprehensive cap and trade program with an offsets component.  In 2011 CCX 
launched the Chicago Climate Exchange Offsets Registry Program to register verified 
emission reductions based on a comprehensive set of established protocols.” Chicago 
Climate Exchange, INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/ 
content.jsf?id=23 (last visited June 9, 2011). 
 68. Carbon Offsets: The U.S. Voluntary Market is Growing, but Quality Assurance 
Poses Challenges for Market Participants, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 10 (Aug. 
2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081048.pdf. 
 69.  This law has proven controversial and may be the subject of a failed recall 
referendum in California. 
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pledged to meet that commitment.71  Furthermore, using its unique power to 
establish independent automotive standards under the Clean Air Act,72 
the State of California in 2005 sought EPA permission to regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles, permission that was ultimately 
granted by the Obama administration in 2009.73  Other states have been 
active as well.  In 2005, a group of northeastern states formed the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), a cooperative effort to regulate 
GHGs within their borders using a marketable permit system74 not 
unlike the one already in place in the European Union.75  The Western 
climate-change.html (“Backers of Proposition 23, the ballot initiative to suspend 
California’s ambitious global warming law, conceded defeat.”).  Also, I found information on 
a current judicial challenge to AB 32: “California’s measures to combat climate change 
have suffered a temporary setback last week as Judge Ernest A. Goldsmith of San 
Francisco Superior Court enjoined California’s Air Resources Board (CARB) from 
further rule-making to implement the California Global Warming Solutions Act (A.B. 
32) in Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Board.  The main 
crux of the opinion is that the Air Resources Board, which is tasked with preparing and 
approving a ‘Scoping Plan’ to reduce carbon emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 by A.B. 
32, did not consider any alternatives to the cap and trade scheme it eventually decided 
on.  The Court stated that ‘the A.R.B. seeks to create a fait accompli by premature 
establishment of a cap-and-trade program before alternatives can be exposed to public 
comment and properly evaluated by the A.R.B. itself.’”  Sinan Diniz, California’s 
Climate Change Law Suffers Legal Setback, GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2011), 
http://gielr.wordpress.com/2011/03/25/californias-climate-change-law-suffers-legal-setback. 
 71. See Peter Henderson, California Gov. to Get Chance to ‘Mark’ Climate Law, 
REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/17/carbon-california-
idUSN1719801220110417 (“Brown’s support of the state’s broad climate change law 
was a hallmark of his campaign last year to be governor again . . . .”). 
 72. California is the only state authorized to establish its own standards for 
automobiles.  The other 49 states may choose to apply either the federal standards or the 
California standards. 
 73. California’s petition to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars was 
rejected by EPA during the Bush administration on the grounds that carbon dioxide is 
not a “pollutant” under the Clean Air Act.  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court 
determined that EPA does have the power to regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant under 
the Clean Air Act.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).  In June of 
2009, EPA during the Obama administration reversed its position and granted California 
permission to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars.  Gary Gengel & Kegan 
Brown, President Obama Directs EPA to Reconsider California Waiver Request to Regulate 
Greenhouse Gases, BLOOMBERG L. REP. (2009), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/ 
pubContent/_pdf/pub2779_1.pdf. 
 74. Under RGGI, participating states are seeking a 10% reduction in carbon 
dioxide emissions from within their borders by 2018. 
 75. Under the RGGI program, most marketable permits (called “emissions 
allowances”) are auctioned off to emitters, and the proceeds invested in energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, and other clean energy technologies.  This marks a contrast with the 
acid rain program, in which pollution rights are distributed to emitters free of charge, 
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Climate Initiative, a western counterpart to RGGI, has struggled to get 
off the ground.76 Meanwhile, the Obama EPA has begun the process 
of regulating GHGs as pollutants under the Clean Air Act.77  That effort 
has met with resistance from Republicans and coal state Democrats in 
Congress.78  However, as support for climate science’s basic conclusions 
grows worldwide,79 and EPA and the states continue to press for GHG 
emissions limits, the relative price of fossil fuel generation seems likely to 
increase. 
All of these developments—state RPSs, tax credits and carbon 
regulation—have stimulated innovation and improvements in wind and 
based on past emissions.  The European Union’s carbon trading scheme also distributes 
its pollution rights free of charge, for the most part. 
 76. “The Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”) will be the most ambitious attempt to 
reduce GHGs and combat global warming.  However, with ambitions come pragmatic 
problems, chief among these is the question of how to enforce the parties’ compliance 
with their obligations under the WCI.  This is particularly relevant because the WCI 
contains no enforcement body, and relies on nothing but the good faith of the individual 
jurisdictions to enforce the agreement.”  See Brooks V. Rice, The “Triumph” of the 
Commons: An Analysis of Enforcement Problems and Solutions in the Western Climate 
Initiative, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 401, 402 (2010). 
 77. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 
71). 
 78. “Congressional Republicans vowed Wednesday to prevent the Environmental 
Protection Agency from reducing the pollution that contributes to global warming, 
underscoring the threat with a proposed deep cut to the agency’s budget.  ‘Congress 
intends to reassert itself in the statutory and regulatory process at EPA and specifically 
the Clean Air Act,’ said Rep. Ed Whitfield, R-Ky., chair of a House subcommittee on 
energy and power at the start of a hearing Wednesday on a draft bill that would block the 
EPA from using the act to control heat-trapping pollution.”  Dina Cappiello, Global 
Warming Fix Heats up Hearing with EPA Chief, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011/feb/10/global-warming-fix-heats-hearing-epa 
-chief/?print. 
 79. In 2008, “the Rudd government released a ‘Green Paper’ outlining its initial 
plans for a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), a policy based on a cap-and-
trade approach to emissions reductions along the lines of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS).  A ‘White Paper’ outlining the final plans for the proposed 
CPRS was subsequently released in December, 2008, as the Australian government 
announced a emissions reductions target of between 5% (unilaterally) and 15% (in 
concert with other nations) reduction below 2020 levels, and a proposed 60% reduction 
by 2050 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008).  In the face of severe criticism for its lack 
of ambition (Foley, 2008) the government justified its target in terms of the implications 
for per capita emissions, which it argued were on par with those promised by other 
nations.  It was not long before the Rudd government responded to its critics who said 
that the targets were not ambitions enough.  In May, 2009 the interim target was 
increased to a 25% reduction and the proposed starting implementation date for the 
CPRS was delayed to 2011, justified on the need to allow the economy to regain strength 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Australian Government, 2009a).”  Roger 
A. Pielke, Jr., An Evaluation of the Targets and Timetables of Proposed Australian 
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solar power projects.  The wind turbines of today are much larger and 
more efficient than the wind turbines of the late 20th century.80  In the 
first decade of the 21st century, installed wind power capacity in United 
States has grown fifteen-fold, from 2,472 MW in 2000 to 40,180 MW in 
2010.81  Likewise, photovoltaic (“PV”) solar cells have grown more 
energy-efficient over time,82 and thin-film solar technology has helped 
improve the cost efficiency of PV solar power.  Concentrated solar 
power (“CSP”) has experienced similar efficiency improvements.83  As a 
consequence, installed solar capacity in United States by the top 10 solar 
utilities has doubled since 2009.84  Not surprisingly, the U.S. Energy 
 80. “[T]he main trends dominating the wind energy market in recent years . . . 
[are] the size increase of contemporary [wind turbines], . . . efficiency improvements, 
and a long-term reduction of the specific investment cost per kW (turnkey cost).”  See 
John K. Kaldellis & D. Zafirakis, The Wind Energy (R)evolution: A Short Review of a 
Long History, 36 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1887, 1894 (2011), available at http://www. 
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960148111000085. 
 81. U.S. Installed Wind Capacity and Wind Project Locations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp#current (last 
visited June 13, 2011). 
 82. See Martin A. Green, The Path to 25% Silicon Solar Cell Efficiency: History of 
Silicon Cell Evolution, 17 PROGRESS IN PHOTOVOLTAICS: RESEARCH & APPLICATIONS 
183, 183 (2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pip.892/abstract 
(“The first silicon solar cell was reported in 1941 and had less than a 1% energy 
conversion efficiency compared to the 25% efficiency milestone reported in this paper.  
Standardization of past measurements shows there has been a 57% improvement 
between confirmed results in 1983 and the present result.”). 
 83. “The key to the commercial development of CSP is establishing a consistent 
annual deployment schedule leading to lower costs.  In a US-DOE sponsored study, 
Sargent and Lundy (2003) estimated that such cost reductions could be realized through 
economies of scale by building large plants, through learning-curve experience with 
manufacturing components in volume, and through technical improvements from 
continuing research (Shinnar and Citro, 2006).  The Solar Energy Task Force of the 
Western Governors’ Association (WGA) concluded that CSP electricity prices of 
$0.10/kWh or lower are possible with construction of 4 GW by 2015 (San Diego 
Regional, 2005; WGA, 2006).  To help meet the CSP deployment goal, the US-
DOE’s Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Office and the WGA agreed to 
promote the installation of 1 GW of new parabolic trough CSP plants by 2010.”  Vasilis 
M. Fthenakis et al., The Technological, Geographical, and Economic Feasibility for 
Solar Energy to Supply the Energy Needs of the US, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 387, 390 (2009), 
available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421508004072. 
 84. Table 4 U.S. Electric Net Summer Capacity, 2005–2009, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
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Information Administration projects further growth in installed capacity 
for these electricity generation technologies in the near future.85 
B.  Limits to Growth: Intermittency, Variability, and Geography 
While renewables have done well in recent years, it remains true 
that most new renewable electricity comes from wind energy.  Growth in 
wind power dwarfs the growth of all other renewable resources over the 
last decade.  Of course, wind power is intermittent.  It increases and 
decreases as wind speeds change.  Therefore, the amount of electricity 
generated by a wind farm over time will be significantly less predictable 
than the amount of electricity generated by fossil fuel generation.  This 
poses a problem for grid operators, who must continuously balance loads.  
Wind power is dispatched to the grid whenever it is available because in 
the usual case, generation sources are dispatched to the grid in ascending 
order of marginal cost.  The marginal cost of wind generation is effectively 
zero, and so it is dispatched even before cheap coal power.  Thus, 
because of the possibility that wind generation levels may decrease at any 
moment, grid operators must maintain spinning reserves and regulation 
from other sources. 
Because grid operators cannot count on wind capacity, they may deny 
wind generation capacity credits available to more reliable sources 
of electricity, and/or penalize wind generators financially for failing to 
provide forecasted amounts of energy and for the additional ancillary 
services that must be made available to back up wind.  Wind generators 
claim that these practices are unfair, and that wind forecasting has improved 
greatly,86 reducing the amount of regulation and reserves needed to 
supplement wind power.  FERC apparently agrees, and in November 2010 
it proposed a rule on the integration of “variable energy resources” 
(“VERs”).87  The proposed rule would require transmission utilities 
 85. The Annual Energy Outlook 2011 contains three different scenarios for the 
growth of renewable energy.  Under the Reference Case, it is assumed that existing laws 
and regulations will remain unchanged throughout the projection period, unless the 
legislation establishing the law sets a sunset date or specifies how they will change.  The 
No Sunset Case assumes the extension of tax credits for renewable energy sources and 
for energy-efficient building equipment.  The Extended Policies Case includes the No 
Sunset assumptions, plus an increase in certain energy-efficiency standards.  “In 2035, 
the share of total electricity generation accounted for by renewables is 14 percent in the 
Reference Case, as compared with 16 percent in the No Sunset case and the Extended 
Policies case.”  See Annual Energy Outlook 2011 with Projections to 2035, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. 18–21 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383 
(2011).pdf. 
 86. Joshua Z. Rokach, Bending to the Wind, 24 THE ELECTRICITY J. 86, 88 (2011). 
 87. “Accordingly, the Proposed Rule would: (1) require public utility transmission 
providers to offer intra-hourly transmission scheduling; (2) incorporate provisions 
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(including RTOs and ISOs) to schedule transmission in smaller increments 
of time (15 minutes rather than 60 minutes), thereby increasing the 
probability that wind power will hit its projected generation target within 
the specified increment.  In order to promote centralized wind forecasting, 
the rule would require wind generators to provide wind forecasting data 
to transmission utilities.  Finally, the rule would also require transmission 
utilities to provide regulation service necessary to support wind.  FERC 
hopes that these changes will ease wind integration into the transmission 
system. 
Nevertheless, wind power remains an intermittent resource, and must 
be backed up by other sources.  When that source is a fossil fuel generator, 
that generator will be burning fuel and producing emissions, even if it is 
not dispatching electricity to the grid.  Moreover, a fossil fuel generator 
will be cycling up and down to match the variability of wind production.  
This means that the fossil fuel generator will be operating less efficiently, 
causing more wear and tear (and costs).  More importantly, it will be 
consuming more fuel per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity dispatched to 
the grid, and therefore produce more pollution emissions. 
Thus, if wind power is displacing fossil fuel generation, it will result 
in a reduction of GHG emissions, but not on a MWh to MWh basis.  
Recently, there have been a number of studies on the environmental 
effects of integrating wind into the electric grid, and they have reached 
somewhat inconsistent conclusions.  The Eastern Wind Integration Study88 
examined four scenarios: three involved 20 percent penetration of wind 
into the Eastern Interconnection (about a tenfold increase above current 
levels) in different onshore and offshore configurations, and a fourth 
into the pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement requiring interconnection 
customers whose generating facilities are variable energy resources to provide 
meteorological and operational data to public utility transmission providers for the 
purpose of power production forecasting; and (3) add a generic ancillary service rate 
schedule through which public utility transmission providers will offer regulation service 
to transmission customers delivering energy from a generator located within the 
transmission provider’s balancing authority area.  The proposed reforms will remove 
barriers to the integration of variable energy resources.”  Integration of Variable Energy 
Resources, 133 Fed. Reg. 61,149, 61,149 (Nov. 18, 2010), amending 18 C.F.R.               
§ 35.28(c)–(f), available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2010/111810/E-
1.pdf. 
 88. EnerNex Corp., Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study, NAT’L 
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looked at 30 percent wind penetration.89  Carbon emissions reductions 
under these scenarios ranged from between 4 and 5 percent in the three 
“20 percent wind scenarios,” and jumped to more than 18 percent in the 
“30 percent wind scenarios.”  Assuming future regulation yielding a high 
($100/ton) carbon price, emissions reductions jump to more than 32 
percent.90  By contrast, a study of the integration of wind at high levels 
in Colorado and Texas, performed by the Bentek Corporation, concluded 
that integration of wind into those systems would require the cycling of 
coal-fired power plants; consequently, emissions reductions from 
integration of wind were negligible (for carbon dioxide) or negative 
(for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides).91  A study of the effects of 
integrating wind in the Southwest Power Pool reached similar conclusions, 
crediting the need to cycle coal plants more frequently.92 
In some systems, however, wind power is backed up by something other 
than fossil fueled generators.  In the Scandinavian grid, for example, 
Danish wind power is backed up by hydroelectric power, some of it 
Danish and some of it from elsewhere in Scandinavia.93  The Spanish 
system also backs up renewables with hydroelectric power.94  While 
hydroelectric power does not generate carbon emissions, using hydroelectric 
power to match wind requires hydroelectric stations to operate in storage 
rather than run-of-river mode,95 which has adverse impacts on wetlands 
 89. The authors of the study deemed each of these scenarios technically feasible, 
but each would require additional investments and transmission infrastructure.  They also 
concluded that with proper infrastructure investments, these levels of wind penetration 
would increase electricity prices by only about a half a cent per kWh.  Id. at 27–30. 
 90. Id. at 47–50. 
 91. How Less Became More: Wind, Power and Unintended Consequences in the 
Colorado Energy Market, BENTEK ENERGY 73 (2010), available at http://www.bentek 
energy.com/Index.aspx. 
 92. See J. Nicholas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in 
Integrating Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 33, 33 (2010). 
 93. “As found in Northern Germany and Denmark, where wind is already 
responsible for 20% of generation, balancing may be achieved through good forecasting 
and use of geographic, as well as fuel, diversification.  Here stored hydroelectric power 
and natural gas generation back up intermittent renewable supply . . . .”  See M.K. 
Heiman, Expectations for Renewable Energy Under Market Restructuring: The U.S. 
Experience, 31 ENERGY 1052, 1057 (2005). 
 94. “Over the last ten years, [feed-in tariff] systems have become an effective 
instrument for European countries to generate electricity from [renewable energy sources 
(“RES”)], especially through wind turbine production.  Germany, Denmark, and Spain 
have been the most successful of these countries.  Through this system, distributors are 
required to buy the energy generated by RES at the price determined by the regulator for 
a certain period of time.”  See Aitor Ciarreta et al., Renewable Energy Sources in the 
Spanish Electricity Market: Instruments and Effects, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY REV. 2510, 2514 (2011), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ 
article/pii/S1364032111000724. 
 95. A standard hydroelectric project can store water behind the dam and let the 
reservoir level rise when power is not needed, and run water through the powerhouse to 
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and aquatic ecology in the reservoirs of hydroelectric facilities.  Moreover, 
sometimes other values will trump carbon emissions considerations.  
Recently, high river flows caused the temporary oversupply of 
hydroelectricity in the Northwest, leading the Bonneville Power 
Administration to limit the dispatch of otherwise available wind energy, 
in order to protect fisheries in the affected rivers and the reliability of the 
grid.96 
More work needs to be done to resolve these conflicting projections, 
but there may be reason for some optimism.  From a climate change 
point of view, it would be ideal if wind power could be backed up by 
another clean resource.  Nuclear power cannot cycle quickly enough to 
back up wind, and is facing its own set of political and other problems in 
the wake of the Fukushima disaster.97  The use of hydroelectric power as 
a backup for wind in Scandinavia and Spain seems ideal from a climate 
change perspective, but is only an option where hydroelectric power is 
plentiful and where there is a willingness to operate hydro stations to 
back up wind.  As a backup for wind, natural gas is an option and has 
advantages over coal.  It emits fewer GHGs, and newer combined cycle 
gas turbines are being built to cycle up and down more efficiently, 
reducing the emissions associated with cycling.98  Moreover, the emissions 
effects of cycling in even the older, less efficient gas-fired turbines are 
less severe than those associated with cycling coal plants.  Some speculate 
that solar power can match wind effectively, since their production profiles 
are complementary.  The wind tends to blow harder at night, when the 
sun isn’t shining, and less so during the day.  It may also be possible to 
generate electricity when power is needed.  The alternative (and the norm in the United 
States) is to operate hydroelectric projects in run of river mode, such that the amount of 
water entering the reservoir from upstream equals the amount of water being run through 
the powerhouse any given moment.  Pumped storage hydroelectric projects do not use a 
dam and are designed as storage facilities.  In pump storage projects, water is pumped 
uphill to a reservoir for storage, and then run down through a powerhouse when 
electricity is needed. 
 96. Press Release, Bonneville Power Admin., High River Flows Caused Limits on 
Thermal, Wind Generation (May 18, 2011), available at http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/ 
BPANews/ArticleTemplate.cfm?ArticleId=article-20110518-01. 
 97. See Simon Lomax, Japan Nuclear Crisis to Force U.S. Changes, NRC 
Members Say, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2011-06-
16/japan-nuclear-crisis-to-force-u-s-changes-nrc-members-say-1-.html (“Lawmakers and 
regulators are taking a closer look at U.S. reactors after a magnitude-9 earthquake and 
tsunami on March 11 knocked out power lines at Tokyo Electric Co.’s Fukushima Dai-
Ichi plant”). 
 98. Puga, supra note 92, at 34. 
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back up wind with demand-side resources, which are the subject of the 
next section of this essay. 
III.  EFFICIENCY AND CONSERVATION 
In principle, if our goal is to reduce the GHG intensity of our electric 
generation mix, we could back up wind with demand response—short 
term changes in demand that mirror changes in wind production.  For 
that matter, we could do even more to fight climate change with 
demand-side management: that is, we could reduce our GHG emissions 
(irrespective of any change in the electric generation mix) simply by 
reducing the amount of electricity we use to provide the same services.  
Indeed, some analysts point to conservation and greater energy efficiency as 
the key to combating climate change.  The logic of conservation and 
efficiency is simple.  It is not electricity that we really want: rather, it is 
the services that electricity provides.  If we can obtain those same 
services using less electricity, we can (i) save money, and (ii) reduce the 
environmental impacts associated with exploiting coal and other fuels to 
generate electricity.  Because we can save money by using energy more 
efficiently, many of the gains associated with maximizing energy efficiency 
are already being realized.  According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, the energy intensity of the American economy (measured 
in year 2000 dollars) declined from $19.57 per British thermal unit 
(“BTU”) in 1949 to $8.52 per BTU in 2008.99  Businesses, in particular, 
have exploited energy efficiency opportunities better since the energy 
crises of the 1970s. 
But there remain additional unrealized opportunities as well.  The 
American economy generates more output per capita than other economies; 
however, despite efficiency gains, per capita energy consumption in the 
United States remains very high—nearly double that of the average Western 
European.100  Nearly half of the possible reductions for stabilizing GHG 
concentrations that Socolow and Pacala identify in their stabilization 
wedges analysis can be realized through various forms of conservation 
 99. See Annual Energy Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb/0105.html. 
 100. In 2006, United States per capita consumption of primary energy was 334.6 
million BTU, compared to 134.8 million BTU per capita in Europe.  International Total 
Primary Energy Consumption and Energy Intensity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,  available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/energyconsumption.html (last visited Sept. 
25, 2011).  In 2007, estimates for electricity consumption as “kWh/capita” show that 
U.S. individual demand (13,616 kWh) greatly exceeds demand in Germany (7,185 
kWh), Spain (6,296 kWh), and the United Kingdom (6,142 kWh).  See Key World 
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or efficiency.101  Similarly, a recent study by the consulting firm McKinsey 
and Co. predicted that energy efficiency investments could yield a 23 
percent reduction in energy demand in the United States, and benefits 
that more than double the costs.102 
If there remain cost-effective opportunities to reduce energy consumption, 
why aren’t these opportunities being realized?103  Some scholars ascribe 
these unrealized opportunities to behavioral heuristics that prevent people 
from recognizing the opportunities posed by efficiency investments, and 
suggest that the problem is one of “norm activation.”104  Economist 
Stephen DeCanio calls this tendency of consumers to miss opportunities 
to save money through energy efficiency “the energy efficiency paradox.”105  
John Dernbach argues that people pass up opportunities to save energy 
and money because the issue of energy efficiency is not sufficiently 
salient to them.  They lack information about the energy they are using, 
about opportunities to save money by using less energy, and (perhaps 
most importantly) about how much energy their peers are using.  
Dernbach argues that governments and private standard-setting 
organizations can activate norms of energy efficiency by ensuring that 
consumers understand national and local energy efficiency goals and 
 101. Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 969–70.  For a detailed breakdown of the 
various energy efficiency law and policy improvements that might comprise these various 
wedges, see John Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: 
Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37 ENVT’L L. REV. 10003, 
10014–27 (2007). 
 102. Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy, MCKINSEY & CO. 7 (July 
2009), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/Client_Service/Electric_Power_and_ Natural 
_Gas/Latest_thinking/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/EPNG/PDFs/Unlocking
%20energy%20efficiency/US_energy_efficiency_full_report.ashx. 
 103. The problem, argued McKinsey, is that the various energy-saving opportunities in 
the U.S. economy are fragmented, spread across more than 100 million locations and 
billions of individual devices, making coordinated solutions difficult.  Thus, part of the 
problem is that many of the remaining unrealized energy efficiency opportunities can be 
realized only by individuals, not businesses.  They are attached to individual consumers’ 
decisions: to purchase relatively energy inefficient homes, cars, and appliances, for example.  
Id. at viii, 22–23. 
 104. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 
327 SCIENCE 1204 (2010) (summarizing some of the literature on new norms and energy 
consumption, and suggesting ways to activate norms of conservation and efficiency 
investment); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon Neutral 
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1697 (2007); John C. Dernbach, Overcoming the 
Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL 
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15 (2007). 
 105. Stephen J. DeCanio, The Efficiency Paradox: Bureaucratic and Organizational 
Barriers to Profitable Energy-Saving Investments, 26 ENERGY POL’Y 441, 443 (1998). 
 293 
 
SPENCE - FINAL NO AUTHOR EDITS TO ACCEPT (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2016  11:29 AM 
 
have access to information about their (and their peers’) energy usage.106  
This view is echoed by many others,107 including the authors of the 
McKinsey & Co. study.108  Of course, only some of these opportunities 
involve electricity consumption; others involve consumption of 
transportation fuels, natural gas in homes and businesses, etc.  On the other 
hand, Socolow and Pacala identify electricity consumption efficiency 
(including demand reduction) as a stand-alone carbon wedge,109 
implying the possibility of significant emissions reduction gains through 
more efficient electricity consumption. 
One way to promote demand reduction is to price the electricity to 
reflect scarcity, that is, to allow consumers to be exposed to higher retail 
prices when demand is highest and reserve (supply) margins lowest.  A 
few states are beginning to experiment with dynamic pricing,110 but only 
tentatively.  The ERCOT wholesale market in Texas, has recently moved 
to “locational marginal pricing,” also known as “nodal pricing,” which 
prices wholesale electricity in ways that reflect the full cost of delivery 
to particular nodes on the Texas electric grid at particular times of day.111  
This is a form of dynamic pricing at the wholesale level.  However, 
these tentative steps aside, state regulators have not shown much 
appetite for this kind of dynamic pricing or real-time pricing at the retail 
level,112 which, after all, exposes customers to substantial price risk.  
 106. Dernbach, supra note 104, at 28–35, 40. 
 107. See Michael P. Vandenberg, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal 
Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005) (exploring the 
implications of norm activation in environmental law generally); Michael P. Vandenberg, 
Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 715, 763–79 (2011) (exploring the implications of behavioralism for 
aspects of energy policy); Dean Karlan, Nudges for Energy Conservation, ECOALIGN 
(June 2010), http://www.ecoalign.com/node/365?sid=3197 (proposing a variety of 
regulatory policies aimed at promoting energy conservation); Robert Spencer & Mani 
Vadari, Smart Grid: A Customer Challenge, 147 PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY 48 (2009), 
available at http://www.fortnightly.com/display_pdf.cfm?id=10012009SmartGridCust 
Challenge.pdf (contending that reducing consumption requires much more than new 
pricing structures). 
 108. Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy, supra note 102, at 26, 93, 
95–97. 
 109. Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 968–69. 
 110. Real-time pricing and dynamic pricing is referred to as a pricing system under 
which customers would pay rates for electricity that reflect the cost of providing it is on a 
real-time basis. 
 111. ERCOT—What’s Changing, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TX., http:// 
nodal.ercot.com/about/wc/index.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
 112. FERC is also encouraging the use of real-time pricing, or dynamic pricing, 
reasoning that for electricity markets to allocate resources efficiently, electricity prices 
must fluctuate.  Specifically, during times of scarcity, high prices will provide customers 
with an incentive to reduce their demand and will send a signal to prospective entrants to 
the generating capacity market to increase supply.  This requires the ability to measure 
electricity consumption on a real-time basis, rather than the once-a-month, meter-reader 
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In states that have moved to competitive retail markets, electricity retailers 
manage price risk on behalf of their retail customers.  Electric retailers 
may face volatile scarcity prices as buyers in organized wholesale markets 
(those managed by RTOs and ISOs), but they generally protect their 
customers from those rapid price swings by offering customers fixed 
price contracts or variable price contracts that mute the effects of short-
term wholesale price swings on retail prices.  To protect themselves against 
wholesale market price risks, utilities turn to futures markets or other 
derivatives markets.113 
For its part, FERC has promoted policies encouraging demand 
response by nudging ISOs and RTOs to use demand reduction in times 
of electricity scarcity.  FERC’s Order 719 required ISOs and RTOs to 
examine both demand- and supply-side responses to the problem of 
scarcity, and required RTOs and ISOs to accept demand response bids in 
supply-constrained spot markets for the physical delivery of electricity.114  
FERC’s Order 890 did the same for the provision of ancillary services in 
electricity markets.115  In addition, many ISOs and RTOs are addressing 
the problem of long-term resource adequacy (that is, the problem of 
ensuring that there will be adequate electric generating capacity in the 
future) by maintaining “capacity markets,” in which electric service 
providers pay suppliers of electric generating capacity for making that 
measurements that have been traditional in the electricity industry.  The introduction of 
“smart meters” and “smart grid” architecture will enable these kinds of more refined 
measurements.  Many states are engaged in complementary efforts, which have led to the 
introduction of smart meters and smart grid architecture in some parts of the country. 
See FERC: Industries—Smart Grid, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/ 
indus-act/smart-grid.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
 113. Derivatives markets allow companies exposed to price risk to hedge that risk 
by purchasing the right to buy or sell energy at a fixed price in the future.  An electricity 
retailer may use futures or other types of derivatives to ensure the right to acquire 
electricity on the wholesale market at a price certain in the future.  Alternatively, it may 
purchase a futures contract, which entitles it to purchase natural gas (to feed its natural 
gas-fired electric generating facilities) at a price certain in the future.  In this way, 
derivatives products allow energy companies to minimize the effects of price swings in 
the future.  For more on energy derivatives markets, see David B. Spence, Can Law 
Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 804–06 (2008). 
 114. Order No. 719, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electricity 
Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,107 (Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35). 
 115.  Order No. 890-A, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in 
Transmission Service, 73 Fed. Reg. 2,984, 3,044–45 (Dec. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 37); Order 719, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,107. 
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capacity available to serve load in the future.116  Order 719 specified 
that ISOs and RTOs must accept bids for future demand reduction, 
along with bids for supply capacity from plants, in those capacity 
markets.117 
More recently, FERC issued Order 745, requiring ISOs and RTOs to 
compensate providers of demand response resources in balancing markets 
by paying those providers the full locational marginal price for those 
resources.118  FERC’s intention is to provide a further incentive for ISOs 
and RTOs to look to demand response rather than generation alternatives 
when trying to balance loads.  Some commentators contend that paying full 
locational marginal price for demand response resources overcompensates 
the providers of those resources.  Locational marginal prices reflect the 
value of both generation capacity and the energy provided to a particular 
location on the grid.  The provider of demand response essentially agrees 
to forgo consumption in order to help balance loads at a particular time 
and place.  Under Order 745, when a provider of demand response forgoes 
consumption in this way, he forgoes paying for that energy.  Critics say 
that by compensating the provider of these demand response services 
with a price that reflects not only the avoided generating capacity but also 
the avoided energy costs, the provider is double compensated for those 
energy costs.119  FERC has responded to these concerns by limiting the 
requirement that providers of demand response receive full locational 
marginal price for their resources to situations in which paying that price 
increases net benefits to consumers as a group.120 
All of these developments should push organized electricity markets 
toward greater energy efficiency, but progress will be incremental.  There 
remains a strong political resistance to exposing end-users (at least, 
residential consumers) to prices that reflect the true cost of delivered 
electricity over short-term increments of time.  This resistance will mean 
that some price inefficiency will remain in the system, dampening the 
energy efficiency gains realizable from proper pricing, for the foreseeable 
future. 
 116. For a description of the New York Independent System Operator’s capacity 
markets, see NYISO (About NYISO—Understanding the Markets—The Capacity Market), 
NYISO, http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/understanding_the_markets/capacity_ 
market/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
 117.  Order No. 719, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,114. 
 118.  Order No. 745, Demand Response Compensation and Organized Electricity 
Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,666–67 (Mar. 15, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
A large part of our carbon emissions come from fossil fueled electric 
generating plants.  Therefore, it is entirely understandable that we might 
look to renewable sources of electricity as a way to reduce our carbon 
emissions, and to energy efficiency as a way to reduce our electricity 
consumption.  We know that we are capable of generating electricity 
from wind, solar and other clean sources, and that we are improving our 
ability to integrate that electricity into the grid.  Similarly, we know that 
there exist significant opportunities to reduce our electricity usage 
through efficiency improvements.  It follows, then, that we ought to be 
able to drastically increase the percentage of electricity that comes from 
renewable sources, and drastically decrease the amount of electricity we 
consume.  However, it is not that simple.  There are still important and 
fundamental impediments to the integration of very large quantities of 
wind and solar power into the electric generation mix. 
First, these sources of electricity remain significantly more expensive 
than their traditional counterparts.  Even if it were technically possible 
for us to rely primarily on renewable sources of electricity, doing so would 
drastically increase electricity costs.  Second, renewable electricity is 
often intermittent, and that intermittency continues to pose problems for 
operators of the electric grid.  In order to maintain a reliable electricity 
delivery system, grid operators must find ways to match short-term 
fluctuations in wind and solar power with corresponding adjustments to 
other (often fossil-fueled) sources of power, and/or to demand.  This is 
not easy.  More importantly, the process of scaling electricity production 
from fossil-fueled plants up and down to match fluctuations in renewable 
power reduces energy efficiency and increases the pollution intensity of 
that generation.  Thus, according to some recent studies, the integration 
of much larger amounts of wind power into the electric system will 
result in only nominal or small reductions in GHG emissions.  As an 
alternative, we might match fluctuation in renewable electricity supply 
with demand-side responses in order to balance loads.  However, that 
too has proven a complicated and difficult proposition, at least so far. 
There are behavioral impediments to investment in energy efficiency 
improvements, and we underinvest in those kinds of improvements.  For 
its part, FERC is trying to encourage grid operators and electric utilities 
to make better use of demand-side resources.  Orders 719 and 745 provide 
incentives and mandates that ought to result in better usage of demand 
reduction and demand response as tools to balance loads.  Nevertheless, 
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electric retailers seem loath to expose retail customers to the kinds of 
price risks that would encourage greater efficiency or demand response. 
This is not to say that we are doomed to a fossil fueled future.  Electric 
utilities and their suppliers are devoting a great deal of energy and 
creativity to overcoming the technical impediments to greater reliance on 
clean sources of electricity, or to greater energy efficiency.  Policymakers 
are attempting to facilitate those efforts, so far in small and measured 
ways.  A policy or technical breakthrough could hasten this process along in 
currently unforeseeable ways.  However, in the near-term, it seems that 
renewable energy and energy efficiency will remain a relatively small, if 
growing, part of the electric system. 
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